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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the district court's order summarily dismissing Mr. Fredy Heredia-
Juarez' s application for post-conviction relief. 
B. General Course of Proceedings 
1. Underlying criminal proceedings 
On approximately December 15, 2006, Fredy participated in the robbery of a credit union 
with James and Jessie. Tr. (8-9-2007) (Change of Plea Hearing)1 p. 13, In. 8-12. Thereafter, 
James became concerned that Jessie was reporting this and other robberies to the authorities. 
PSI, p. 4. James, his brother Michael and Nicole discussed "taking care" of Jessie and Fredy 
agreed to go along. Id. at 4-5. Fredy accompanied the group because he believed the brothers 
would harm him or people he knew ifhe did not Tr. (1-31-2008) (Hearing on Motion to 
Withdraw Plea) p. 84, In. 18 - p. 85, ln. 16; p. 101, ln. 20 - 102, ln. 8. The group told Jessie they 
were going to commit another robbery. PSI, p. 5. Driving in a pick up, Michael and Nicole led 
Fredy, Jessie and James into the hills. Id. Once there, Jessie was shot and ultimately died of his 
wounds. Id. 
The state filed charges and accused Fredy, James, Michael and Nicole of committing first 
degree murder by shooting Jessie and leaving him in a remote location in the middle of the night 
in winter conditions. Tr. (8-9-2007) p. 20, In. 4-14. The state accused Fredy of robbery for his 
participation in the robbery of the credit union. Fredy claimed that he did not shoot Jessie 
1 This transcript, along with other transcripts and records from the underlying criminal 
case, are exhibits in this appeal. These documents are referred to herein by date and description. 
whereas James claimed that Fredy shot the gun. PSI p. 4-5, 12. Fredy's attorney "suggested to 
[the prosecutor] that the only way the State would know whether or not [Fredy] was truthful was 
to provide a polygraph test." R. 141, 319. Counsel then met with Fredy and "advised him that if 
he was in fact telling the truth, the criminal charge would be reduced to that of aiding and 
abetting, and a sentence reflecting the reduced charge would be negotiated." Id. Fredy could not 
afford to pay an independent polygrapher. Id. Rather than move ex parte for funds to hire such 
an expert, counsel allowed the state to arrange for the polygraph exam to be done by law 
enforcement. R. 141-42, 319-20. The polygraph revealed that Fredy was being deceptive with 
regard to his statements regarding the murder. Report Dated 2-6-2007, Attached to PSI. 
Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Fredy agreed to plead guilty to first degree murder 
and robbery in exchange for the state's agreement to dismiss other related charges and to "cap the 
fixed portion of its sentencing recommendation at 35 years." Memorandum2 (8-9-2007). The 
agreement further provided that by "accepting this offer the defendant waives his right to any 
appeals, to any Rule 35 motions and agrees to reserve only his post-conviction remedies" except 
that "if the Judge exceeds the State's recommendation for fixed prison time at sentencing, the 
defendant has the right to file a Rule 35 motion and appeal the sentence." 
Prior to sentencing, Fredy moved to withdraw his guilty plea asserting that he had 
understood the state would recommend a sentence of a maximum term of incarceration of 35 
years, rather than a sentence of 35 to life. Tr. (1-31-2008) p. 78, ln. 5-14. The district court 
denied Fredy's motion. Id. at 175, ln. 21-25. 
The polygraph that Fredy failed, along with James' polygraph that indicated he was being 
2 This Memorandum is an exhibit on appeal. 
2 
truthful when he indicated that Fredy had fired the gun, were attached to the PSI. See PSf. The 
district court sentenced Fredy to a unified term of life with a minimum period of confinement of 
thirty-five years for murder. Tr. (5-9-2008) p. 296. Fredy's attorney informed him that he could 
not appeal his sentence as a result of the plea agreement but that he "should appeal the denial of 
your motion to withdraw your plea." R. 19. Fredy appealed but the state filed a motion to 
dismiss. Order Dismissing Appeal. Fredy's appellate counsel did not respond to the state's 
motion and the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. Id. 
2. Post-conviction proceedings 
Fredy thereafter requested post-conviction relief. R. 5 - 12, 201-208. Fredy alleged that 
his decision to accept the state's offer was based on his understanding from his attorney that the 
state would recommend a sentence of no more than 35 years. R. 167. Fredy alleged that his 
attorneys told him what to say at the change of plea hearing. R. 319. Fredy also alleged that his 
attorney convinced him to submit to a polygraph examination and failed to advise him that its 
results could be used against him during the sentencing phase of the proceeding. R. 319-320. 
Fredy finally alleged that appellate counsel was ineffective for allowing the appeal to be 
dismissed. R. 321. The state filed a motion for summary dismissal which the district court 
granted. Tr. p. 72, In. 4-9. This appeal follows. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Heredia's petition for post-
conviction relief because he established an issue of fact as to whether he received effective 
assistance of trial counsel? 
B. Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. I-Ieredia's petition for post-
,., 
_) 
conviction relief because he established an issue of fact as to whether he received effective 
assistance of appellate counsel? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding which is civil in nature. 
Sparks v. State, 140 Idaho 292,295, 92 P.3d 542,545 (Ct. App. 2004). Summary dismissal of a 
post-conviction action, either upon motion of the court or the state, is permissible only when the 
applicant's evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in the applicant's 
favor, would entitle him to the requested relief. Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269,272, 61 P. 3d 
626,629 (Ct. App. 2002). If such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be 
conducted. Sparks, 140 Idaho at 295, 92 P.3d at 545. 
On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief action without an evidentiary hearing, 
the appellate court determines whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, 
depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file. State v. LePage, 138 Idaho 803, 
807, 69 P.3d 1064, 1068 (Ct. App. 2003). Moreover, the appellate court liberally construes the 
facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 272, 61 
P.3d at 629; Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894, 896, 865 P.2d 985, 987 (Ct. App. 1993). 
The right of a criminal defendant to counsel during trial is guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. 
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, (1963); Milburn v. State, 130 Idaho 649, 652, 946 P.2d 
71, 74 (Ct. App. 1997). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought 
under the post-conviction procedure act. Martinez v. State, 143 Idaho 789, 795, 152 P.3d 1237, 
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1243 (Ct. App. 2007); lvfurray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 924-25, 828 P.2d 1323, 1329-30 (Ct. App. 
1992). A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel will prevail if he shows that ( 1) 
counsel's performance was deficient and, that (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the 
defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
A defendant meets the deficiency prong when counsel's performance falls below an 
objective standard ofreasonableness. }vfitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 277, 971 P.2d 727, 730 
(1998); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). As a general matter, 
this Court will not attempt to second-guess counsel's strategic and tactical choices. State v. 
Elison, 135 Idaho 546, 1, 21 P.3d 483,488 (2001). Nonetheless, this rule does not apply to 
counsel's decisions that are the result of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or 
other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Id. The prejudice prong is met when the 
defendant shows that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of 
the proceedings would have been different. Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177; lvfitchell, 
132 Idaho at 277, 971 P.2d at 730. 
B. The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Heredia's Claim that He 
Received Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel 
1. Mr. Heredia established an issue of fact as to whether he received effective 
assistance of counsel with respect to entry of his guilty plea 
Fredy was reluctant to plead guilty to murder but his attorneys told him the proposed plea 
offer was the best that could be negotiated. R. 358. Fredy understood from his attorney that 
under the plea agreement he faced a maximum of thirty-five years. Id. After the change of plea 
hearing, Fredy came to understand that the plea agreement involved a recommendation for a 
minimum of thirty-five years. Id. As soon as Fredy became aware of the actual terms of the plea 
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agreement, he informed his attorney that wanted to withdraw his guilty plea. id. 
Trial counsel was thus ineffective for convincing Fredy to accept the plea agreement 
without ensuring that he fully understood the terms of the plea bargain. Fredy was prejudiced by 
that deficient performance because he would not have pled guilty but for that misunderstanding. 
a. deficient performance 
Fredy's attorney convinced him to plead guilty to first-degree murder without ensuring 
that he fully understood the terms of that agreement. Counsel told Fredy what to say during the 
change of plea hearing and Fredy believed he had to answer as desired by his attorney and the 
judge. Fredy presented an issue of fact as to whether his attorney adequately advised him with 
respect to his guilty plea. 
In dismissing this claim, the district court found that Fredy did not present any evidence of 
coercion by his attorney. Tr. p. 67, ln. 21 - p. 68, ln.3. However, post-conviction counsel relied 
on the motion to withdraw guilty plea in support of this claim. Tr. P. 38, ln. 15 - pd. 39, ln. 5. 
There, Fredy clarified that he was not asserting his guilty plea was coerced within the legal 
definition of that word and, instead, that Fredy believed he had to respond correctly during the 
change of plea hearing. Tr. (1-31-2008) p. 144, ln. 15-24. Fredy's satisfaction with his attorney's 
performance was based on his belief that the state was going to recommend a maximum sentence 
of35 years. Tr. (1-31-2008) p. 98, In. 12-19; 102, ln. 12-20. 
Fredy believed that his attorney had negotiated a plea bargain pursuant to which the state 
would recommend no more than thirty-five years. Although Fredy believed he had defenses to the 
first-degree murder charge, he said what he believed his attorney and the district com1 wanted him 
to say during the guilty plea in order to take advantage of what he believed was the plea bargain. 
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Fredy presented an issue of material fact as to whether trial counsel performed deficiently by 
failing to ensure that Fredy fully understood the plea agreement. 
b. prejudice 
In order to satisfy the prejudice requirement for an ineffectiveness of counsel claim where 
the defendant has pled guilty, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel's errors, he or she would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to 
trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59(1985); Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 82, 57 P.3d 
787, 793 (2002). Here, as soon as Fredy discovered that he misunderstood the plea agreement, he 
informed his attorney that he wanted to withdraw his plea. Before being sentenced or receiving 
the PSI, he filed a motion to withdraw his plea, which the district court denied. Moreover, Fredy 
had potential defenses to the specific intent element of first-degree murder, which he would have 
asserted if he had truly understood the plea agreement. See Tr. (1-31-2008) p. 128, ln. 4 - p. 130, 
In. 14. Accordingly, Fredy established a reasonable possibility that he would not have pled guilty 
if his attorney had not convinced him to accept the plea agreement without fully explaining its 
terms. 
In dismissing this claim, the district court relied entirely on its conclusion that the change 
of plea hearing established that Fredy was not innocent of first degree murder. Tr. p. 67, ln. 3 - p. 
68, In. 7. The district court thus concluded that Fredy's testimony contradicted his assertions on 
post-conviction and that he could not create an issue of fact with a "sham" affidavit. Tr. p. 67, In. 
16-19. Initially, the inquiry is not whether Fredy is factually innocent of first-degree murder but, 
rather, whether he would have pied guilty if his attorney had fully explained the plea agreement to 
him. Post-conviction counsel specifically relied on the hearing on Fredy's motion to withdraw his 
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guilty plea in support of this claim. Tr. p. 38, In. 15 - p. 39, In. 5. There, the district court 
acknowledged that Fredy had potential defenses to first-degree murder but found that those 
defenses had been waived by the guilty plea. Tr. (1-31- 2008) p. 171, In. 1-3. 
Further, although a "sham" affidavit which directly contradicts prior testimony may be 
disregarded on a summary judgment motion, the rule has limitations. See Matter of Estate of 
Keeven, 126 Idaho 290, 298, 882 P.2d 457,465 (Ct. App. 1994). The sham affidavit rule is in 
tension with the principle that a court's role in deciding a summary judgment motion is not to 
make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence. Van Asdale v. International Game 
Technology, 577 F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir. 2009). The rule must be applied with caution because its 
aggressive invocation threatens to ensnare parties who may have simply been confused. Van 
Asdale, 577 F.3d at 998; Sch. Dist. No. ]Jv. AC and S, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1264 (9th Cir. 1993). 
Therefore, a non-moving party should not be precluded from elaborating upon, explaining or 
clarifying prior testimony. Van Asdale, 577 F.3d at 998. 
The district court agreed that Fredy' s testimony that he "aided and abetted" in the murder 
was the words of his attorney. Tr. p. 67, In. 1-3; Tr. (1-31-2008) p. 164, In. 21-25. Fredy's 
responses to the district court's leading questions do not directly contradict his testimony 
regarding his potential defenses. Fredy's testimony established that he was present during the 
shooting and that the group planned to kill Jessie. This testimony was not inconsistent with his 
testimony at the hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea that he felt like he had to go 
along with the group to avoid harm to him or people he knew. That no one was actively 
threatening Fredy at that time does not mean he did not fear reprisals at later time if he did not go 
along. The reasonableness of that fear was somewhat affirmed by the fact that the group decided 
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to kill Jessie based on no more than suspicions he might be "snitching." Regardless of whether 
Fredy had a true coercion defense, his beliefs could have negated that he had a specific intent to 
aid and abet in the murder. 
Trial counsel performed deficiently by convincing Fredy to enter a guilty plea without 
ensuring that he fully understood the terms of that agreement. But for Fredy's misunderstanding 
of the plea agreement, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. 
Accordingly, the district court erred in summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction 
relief. 
2. Polygraph 
Fredy's counsel suggested "to [the prosecutor] that the only way the State would know 
whether or not [Fredy] was truthful was to provide a polygraph test." R. 141, 3 30. Fredy could 
not afford an independent polygrapher and counsel asked the state to provide a polygrapher. R. 
141-42; 330-31. Counsel informed Fredy that he could not negotiate a better plea bargain as long 
as the prosecutor did not believe Fredy was being truthful with respect to his version of the 
murder. R. 141,330. Counsel advised Fredy "that if he was in fact telling the truth, the criminal 
charge would be reduced to that of aiding and abetting, and a sentence reflecting the reduced 
charge would be negotiated." Id. Counsel told Fredy that he needed to take a polygraph test to 
prove to the prosecutor that he was not lying and that Fredy agreed to do so in the hope of 
convincing him. R. 168. 
Counsel did not explain to Fredy that the polygraph could be used against him later. R. 
168. Although counsel told Fredy not to submit to the test unless he was being truthful, he 
apparently did not tell Fredy that he might fail the test even if he was truthful. See R. 141-42, 
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166-67. Had Fredy understood the ramifications of submitting to the polygraph, he would not 
have agreed to it. 
The district court found that although it was a risky procedure for counsel to allow to take 
place, law enforcement advised Fredy of his rights under Miranda before beginning the interview. 
Tr. p. 69, In. 24 - p. 70, In. 21. The district court thus concluded that Fredy had not met the 
prejudice prong even if counsel's performance was deficient. Tr. p. 70, In. 23 - p. 71, In. 7. 
However, a full discussion with counsel regarding the negative ramifications of the 
polygraph cannot be replaced with the cursory and general advise that the information "may be 
used against him." The district court therefore erred in concluding that Fredy's Miranda waiver 
precluded prejudice from counsel's performance. 
C. The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Heredia's Claim that He 
Received Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 
Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-852, a criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to 
effective assistance of counsel during any appeal. See Hernandez v. State, 127 Idaho 685, 687, 
905 P.2d 86, 88 (1995). Further, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires 
states to ensure that an indigent appellant receives effective assistance of counsel on his first 
appeal ofright from a judgment of conviction. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985); Aragon 
v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 765, 760 P.2d 1174, 1181 (1988). Appellate counsel is required to make 
a conscientious examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be 
made. Jakoski v. State, 136 Idaho 280, 285, 32 P.3d 672, 677 (Ct. App. 2001); LaBelle v. State, 
130 Idaho 115,119,937 P.2d 427,431 (Ct. App.1997). 
The relevant inquiry on the prejudice prong in relation to appellate counsel is whether 
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there is a reasonable possibility that, but for counsel's errors, the applicant would have prevailed 
on appeal. See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259,285 (2000); Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656,665, 
168 P.3d 40, 49 (Ct. App. 2007). Where an applicant would have prevailed on direct appeal if 
appellate counsel had raised the issue in question, the applicant is entitled to post-conviction 
relief. See lvfintun, 144 Idaho at 665, 168 P.3d at 49. 
1. The district court erred in concluding that whether appellate counsel was 
ineffective was moot because the Supreme Court granted the state's motion to 
dismiss the appeal 
Mr. Heredia argued that the waiver of his appellate rights did not extend to his right to 
appeal the district court's decision on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Tr. P. 43, In. 16-22; 
45, In. 17-23.3 The district court concluded that whether appellate counsel was ineffective for 
failing to confer with Fredy regarding the issues to be presented was moot because Fredy waived 
his right to appeal in the plea agreement and the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal based on 
that waiver. Tr. p. 71, In. 8 -p. 72, ln. 9. 
The order dismissing Fredy's direct appeal reads in its entirety: 
A MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL AND STATEMENT IN SUPPORT 
THEREOF was filed by counsel for Respondent on January 21, 2009, requesting 
this Court for an order dismissing, with prejudice, the above entitled appeal based 
on the fact that Defendant Heredia Juarez waived his right to appeal and preserving 
only the right to pursue post-conviction remedies, pursuant to the Rule 11 plea 
agreement he entered in the district court. The Court is fully advised; therefore, 
good cause appearing, IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Respondent's MOTION 
TO DISMISS APPEAL be, and hereby is, GRANTED and this appeal is 
3 In the an1ended petition for post-conviction relief, Mr. Heredia alleged that appellate 
counsel was ineffective for not appealing the district court's decision to consider polygraph 
material during sentencing. R. 125. During oral argument, however, Mr. Heredia argued he 
should have been allowed to appeal the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Tr. p. 
43, ln. 16-22; p. 45, In. 17-23. The district court decided the latter formulation of the issue. Tr. 
p. 71, ln. 13 - p. 72, ln. 3. 
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DISMISSED. 
As reflected in the Supreme Court's order, appellate counsel did not oppose the motion to 
dismiss and the Court did not consider whether the denial of the motion to withdraw guilty plea 
was precluded by the appeal waiver. An appeal from the denial of the motion to withdraw the 
guilty plea draws into question the guilty plea itself. Accordingly, the term of the plea agreement 
by which Fredy agreed to give up his right to appeal should not be construed as precluding his 
ability to appeal the district court refusal to allow him to withdraw his plea. 
2. Mr. Heredia was prejudiced by appellate counsel's ineffective assistance 
because the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea 
A motion to withdraw a plea is governed by I.C.R. 33(c) and the rule distinguishes 
between pleas made prior to and after sentencing, exacting a less rigorous measure of proof for 
presentence motions. State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481,485,861 P.2d 51, 55 (1993). A defendant 
seeking to withdraw his guilty plea before sentence need only advance a just reason to withdraw 
his plea. State v. Ballard, 114 Idaho 799,761 P.2d 1151 (1988). The 'just reason" standard does 
4 During argument on the state's summary judgment motion, Mr. Heredia's attorney 
inexplicitly infonned the district court that the issue presented by Mr. Heredia' s attorney on 
appeal was whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Tr. p. 
13, In. 14-18. This Court should be aware that the Appellant's Brief filed in Mr. Heredia's 
appeal actually presented the sole issue of whether the district court abused its discretion in 
sentencing Mr. Heredia an issue squarely precluded by the plea agreement. Appellant's Brief, 
Docket No. 35367, filed January 1 2009. Unfortunately, this patent mischaracterization of the 
record can not be corrected in this appeal. Ultimately, however, even if the mischaracterization 
is accepted, the district court erred in its ruling on Mr. Heredia's appellate counsel claim because 
appellate counsel did not oppose the motion to dismiss. To the extent Mr. Heredia's appellate 
counsel claim is dependent on this Court considering the actual issue presented on direct appeal, 
Mr. Heredia reserves the ability to file a successive post-conviction relief petition alleging that 
his appellate counsel claim was inadequately presented as a result of post-conviction counsel's 
rnischaracterization of the record. 
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not require that the defendant establish a constitutional defect in his or her guilty plea. State v. 
Henderson, 113 Idaho 411,413, 744 P.2d 795, 797 (Ct. App. 1987). Where, as here, the motion is 
made prior to sentencing and the pre-sentence report, judges are encouraged to liberally exercise 
their discretion in allowing defendants to withdraw their guilty pleas. State v. Hocker. 115 Idaho 
13 7, 139, 765 P .2d 162, 164 (Ct. App. 1988); State v. Henderson, 113 Idaho 4 I 1, 744 P.2d 795 
(Ct. App. 1987). 
Fredy testified that in December 2006, he was drinking and using methamphetamine. Tr. 
(1-31-2008) p. 82, In. 13 p. 83, ln. 2; p. 85, In. 6-10. During a three-day period around the 15th 
of December, Fredy smoked methamphetamine hourly and drank approximately 20 beers each 
day. Tr. (1-31-2008) p. 83, ln. 3-13; p. 85, In. 6-10. Fredy became paranoid and began seeing 
things, including clowns, that did not exist. Tr. (1-31-2008) p. 83, ln. 19 - p. 84, In. 5; 101, In. 13-
17. Fredy accompanied the group because he believed the brothers would harm him or people he 
knew if he did not. Tr. (1 1-2008) p. 84, ln. 18 - p. 85, In. 16; 101, In. 20 - 102, ln. 8. 
Fredy, who is relatively young and lacks any legal education, asked to withdraw his plea 
because he understood that the phrase "fixed portion of 35 years" and "cap the fixed portion" 
referred to a sentence of no more than thirty-five years. Tr. (1-31-2008) p. 79, In. 6-9; 79, ln. 20-
23 79, In. 24- p. 80, In. 3. Fredy testified that his attorney had conveyed an offer that included a 
sentencing recommendation of 25 years to life. Tr. (1-31-2008) p. 80, ln. 1 1 Fredy rejected 
that offer because he did not want to agree to a life sentence recommendation. Tr. (1 1-2008) p. 
80, ln. 18-22. 
In denying Fredy's motion, the district court indicated: "the issue for me is whether the 
defendant understood the maximum penalties at the time of plea." Tr. (1-31-2008) p. 148, In. 5-6; 
13 
7; see also p. 154, 11-14. ("The whole issue is whether or not Mr. Heredia was properly advised 
of the minimum and maximum penalties as set forth in that rule"). However, Fredy did not 
contend he did not understand the maximum penalties. Instead, Fredy acknowledged that he 
understood that the judge had the authority to reject the state's recommendation and sentence him 
to life in prison but believed the state was going to ask that he spend no more than 35 years in 
prison. See Tr. (1-31-2008) p.88, In. 13 p. 89, In. 3; see also p. 100, ln. 13-21 (Fredy believed his 
attorney would ask for 10 years and the state would ask for 35 years and the judge would decide). 
Prior to providing the district court with a factual basis for his plea to the murder charge, 
Fredy asked to speak with his attorney because he did not know what to say. Tr. (8-9-2007) p. 20, 
ln. 25 - p. 21, ln. 1; Tr. (1-31-2008) p. 89, In. 4-10. Fredy was not sure what he should say about 
his guilt and asked his attorney. After conferring with counsel, the following exchange occurred: 
Court: 
Fredy: 
So tell me briefly what you did that makes you guilty of these 
charges 
I aided and abetted and I was also an accomplice. I helped them 
with their plan. 
Tr. (8-9-2007) p. 21, In. 13-16. The district court found that Fredy's words were "in fact, [his 
attorney's] words." Tr. (1-31-2008) p.164, In. 21-25; see also p. 165, In. 8-11. The district court 
nevertheless rejected any claim that Fredy was innocent based on the the district court's follow up 
questions about the crime in non legal terms. However, while the questions did not contain legal 
terminology, they were leading: 
Court: 
Fredy: 
Court: 
Fredy: 
Court: 
What was the plan? 
That I was there and the person died and they shot and we left. 
Was the plan to shoot [Jessie] and leave him to die? 
Yes. 
And he was taken from Twin Falls to the South Hills? 
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Fredy: 
Court: 
Fredy: 
Court: 
Fredy: 
Court: 
Fredy: 
Court: 
Fredy: 
Court: 
Fredy: 
Court: 
Fredy: 
Court: 
Fredy: 
Court: 
Fredy: 
Yes. 
And were you with [James] and [Michael] and [Nicole] when 
[Jessie] was taken to the South Hills? 
Yes. 
And did you Intend that [Jessie] die? 
Um, yes. 
And were you acting freely and voluntarily on your own when you 
went with Michael John and James John and Nicole Baker? 
Yes. 
In other words, nobody forced you to go along with them? 
No. 
And before [Jessie] was shot, did you know that it was likely that he 
would be shot? 
Yes. 
And you had thought about that in your own mind for some period 
of time before that actually happened? 
Yes. 
And was there any legal justification that you're aware of for having 
killed [Jessie]? 
No. 
Let me ask that question differently. Mr. Coates wasn't threatening 
any of you with bodily harm? 
No. 
Tr. (8-9-2007) p. 21, ln. 13 - 23, ln. 3. 
The district court's questions plainly suggested the appropriate response in order to lay the 
foundation for guilt. Further, even though the district court correctly concluded that the above 
exchange laid a factual basis for aiding and abetting first-degree murder, those responses were not 
inconsistent with Fredy's potential defense regarding whether he intended to aid and abet or 
whether he accompanied the group to avoid reprisal from the brothers. 
In denying Fredy's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the district court failed to correctly 
understand Fredy's argument or to liberally apply its discretion. Because the district court abused 
its discretion in refusing to permit withdrawal of the plea, Fredy was harmed by appellate 
counsel's deficient performance. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Mr. Heredia respectfully asks this Court to reverse the district court's order summarily 
dismissing his application for post-conviction relief and to remand this case to the district court 
for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this L day of November, 2011. 
NEVlN, BENJAMil\J, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
---~~ 
~~· / . {~~1/ B~:~ 
Attorney for Fredy Heredia-Juarez 
16 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thisJ_ day of November, 2011, I caused two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing to be mailed to: Office of the Attorney General, P.O. Box 83720, 
Boise, ID 83720-0010. 
17 
